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The world is slowly but inexorably moving towards adopting an 
integrated global patent system. It is inevitable that the present inefficient 
and splintered system in which patents must be separately obtained and 
enforced in each nation state must evolve to make obtaining global patent 
protection an achievable proposition for those other than just the wealthiest 
multinational corporations. The global patent system proposed in this article 
allows a patent applicant to file a single patent application in an 
international patent office, have that patent application examined in 
accordance with a uniform patentability standard, and results in the grant 
of a unitary patent that is enforceable in all member states. The proposed 
system differs significantly from previous proposals for a global patent 
system because it calls for matters of patent enforcement to remain the 
exclusive domain of member states and their courts rather than calling for 
the creation of an international patent court to hear infringement suits. This 
aspect of the proposal makes it a viable alternative to the current system 
because it allows nation states to retain a degree of sovereignty and control 
over the patents that are enforced in their territories, while embracing the 
substantive and procedural efficiencies concomitant with a truly integrated 
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Despite 150 years of admirable international consensus, the global 
patent system remains an inefficient collection of national patent systems 
and national laws. In this disjointed system, patents and national patent 
  
2016 THE TIME IS NIGH 169 
systems are firmly territorial in nature. Nations independently create and 
enforce their own national patent laws, maintain independent national patent 
offices, examine patent applications and grant their own national patents. 
Other than by some regional patent agreements, the norm is that patents for 
inventions are only protected in countries where a patentee has filed a patent 
application and where a patent has been granted. Outside those countries the 
patentee has no protection from imitators. Further, a patent holder must 
enforce each distinct national patent country by country, which is complex, 
incredibly costly and time-consuming.1 
This fragmentation is the natural consequence of a global political and 
economic system that values national sovereignty most highly. Although the 
various harmonization efforts that have taken place in the last 150 years have 
ensured that the concepts of patentability are largely similar around the 
world, there remains a significant lack of uniformity in countries’ substantive 
patent law and patent practice. While the content of a nation’s patent laws is 
largely dictated by the various international treaties and conventions that 
impose minimum standards of intellectual property protection, those treaties, 
for the most part, describe conceptual norms in broad terms that lack 
prescription as to the detail or means by which they are to be implemented 
in legislation. Nation states and their legislatures, therefore, retain a 
significant freedom in deciding how the minimum standards dictated by 
international law are enacted in domestic law. These freedoms have been 
necessary to achieve consensus between nation states to negotiate complex 
international treaties, and are a recognition of the fact that different 
circumstances have necessitated that different standards be applied to suit 
local conditions in various places. However, they also create injustices for 
patent applicants and patentees, whose rights are often smothered by the 
sheer cost of engaging with the system. The territorial nature of patents 
causes unnecessary duplication of effort, both on the part of patentees and 
national patent offices. This duplication in turn imposes exorbitant costs on 
those who seek to patent in multiple countries and enforce patents when they 
are infringed. Patent applicants pay filing fees and maintenance fees in each 
jurisdiction in which protection is sought, along with the legal costs 
associated with preparing and prosecuting each patent application. Then 
there are the exorbitant costs of bringing infringement actions in multiple 
 
 1. Kevin P. Mahne, A Unitary Patent and Unified Patent Court for the European Union: An 
Analysis of Europe’s Long Standing Attempt to Create a Supranational Patent System, 94 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 162, 163 (2012); John H. Barton, Issues Posed By A World Patent System, 7 J. 
INT’L. ECON. L. 341, 352 (2004); MARKETA TRIMBLE, GLOBAL PATENTS: LIMITS OF TRANSNATIONAL 
ENFORCEMENT 82 (Oxford Univ. Press 2012). 
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jurisdictions. The current system also imposes the significant costs of 
running patent offices on nation states.  
Since the domestic patent laws of nation states are not uniform, patent 
applications are often tailored to take account of local legal or procedural 
idiosyncrasies when patents for an invention are sought in different places. 
As such, patent applications in respect of the same invention filed in different 
places are rarely identical (which involves incurring additional costs in each 
jurisdiction in which the patent application is modified), and prior art 
searches and examinations of those patents will rarely be identical, but the 
differences will be in substance immaterial.2 
A recent collection of disputes between Apple Inc. and Samsung 
Electronics Co., Ltd conducted before the courts in the United States, South 
Korea, Britain, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Japan and Australia 
and other places highlights the problem inherent in the need to enforce 
patents separately in each jurisdiction. The high cost of obtaining and 
enforcing parallel national patents runs contrary to the public interest 
because it is a disincentive to innovate. An inventor who is concerned about 
his or her invention being commercialized by others in countries where he 
or she cannot afford to secure a patent may be reluctant to disclose the 
invention in any country, and may instead rely on trade secrets to maintain 
exclusivity in the invention, thereby depriving the public of any disclosure 
of the invention and its workings. Alternatively, he or she may refuse to 
disclose or even use the invention entirely, or opt to not invent at all in favor 
of pursuing other activities. In many cases, those costs are a deterrent to 
would-be inventors. When inventors can afford to patent, the costs are passed 
on to consumers. 
The high costs of obtaining and enforcing patents in multiple 
jurisdictions takes the prospect of getting patent protection in more than a 
handful of countries out of the reach of the vast majority of individuals and 
SMEs. As a result, global patent protection is in most cases only within the 
reach of the best-resourced multinationals.3 In most instances, patent 
applicants seek patents in only a small number of countries. Although the 
decision as to which jurisdictions a patentee will seek to patent in will be 
subject to many factors, including what the invention is and what production 
capacity competitors may have in particular jurisdictions, the marginal cost 
of seeking to patent in additional jurisdictions will be a factor in many cases. 
 
 2. Robert W. Pritchard, The Future is Now - The Case for Patent Harmonization, 20 N.C.J. INT’L 
L. & COM. REG. 291 (1995). 
 3. Michael N. Meller, Planning for a Global Patent System, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 
379, 380 (1998). 
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Those patent applicants who seek patents for the same invention in multiple 
countries file on average in fewer than four countries.4  
The duplication inherent in national patent offices separately examining 
patent applications contributes to patents that fail to satisfy the statutory 
requirements of novelty or inventive step being improperly granted.5 Patent 
offices in countries that actually examine patent applications before granting 
patents have been criticized for failing to provide their examiners with 
sufficient time and incentives to properly examine patents.6  
There are, however, some exceptions to the patent system’s 
territorialism. The first is that a few nations have formed patent communities, 
whereby a patent granted in one community nation is valid in all other 
community nations. One example is the Switzerland-Liechtenstein Patent 
Cooperation Treaty, a bilateral treaty that provides common legislation in 
the field of patents for Switzerland and Liechtenstein. The two countries 
constitute a single patent area; a Swiss patent is effective in Liechtenstein 
and vice-versa. Another notable example is the African Intellectual Property 
Organization (OAPI) Agreement. The agreement created a single patent area 
among French-speaking nations in Africa. Any patent application filed in a 
member state or the regional patent office created by the agreement is treated 
as the equivalent of a national filing in each and every member state. Finally, 
mention should be made of the proposed European Unitary Patent scheme, 
which allows for a single unitary patent enforceable in all participating EU 
states that are parties to the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court.7 
Trimble posits that there are a number of economic and social realities 
that counter any perceived need to maintain the strict territoriality of patents. 
These are that industrialization has spread to all parts of the world; the world 
is much more interconnected in that trade crosses borders and the Internet 
facilitates rapid exchanges of information; and policy making is departing 
from a strictly territorial framework.8 Similarly, Khoury has opined that we 
are already moving away from a strict territoriality and as such we have 
witnessed the end of the national patent office in its conventional form 
 
 4. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, PATENT COOPERATION TREATY YEARLY 
REVIEW: THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 15 (Brenda O’Hanlon, 2016). 
 5. ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN 
PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 137 
(Princeton Univ. Press 2007); Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Vivian S. Kuo, Post-Grant Review of Patents: 
Enhancing the Quality of the Fuel of Interest, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 231, 232 (2003). 
 6. Id. 
 7. European Comm’n, UNITARY PATENT, https://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/intellectual-
property/patents/unitary-patent_en (last visited Aug. 2, 2016). 
 8. See MARKETA TRIMBLE, Preface to GLOBAL PATENTS: LIMITS OF TRANSNATIONAL 
ENFORCEMENT, supra note 1 at vii. 
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because it is no longer compatible with the cross-border characteristics of 
innovation and the way inventions are now being patented, protected, and 
enforced.9 
The proposal contained in this article advocates the breakdown of this 
territorialism and is the next logical step in a natural progression that builds 
upon the significant steps that have been taken already towards achieving a 
global system.  
The history of patent law has arguably always been one of international 
integration and harmonization. Its beginnings lie in nation states noting the 
benefits of other countries’ patent systems and adopting similar systems of 
their own.10  
The first steps towards a world or global patent system were taken by 
those who instigated the 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property.11 The Paris Convention (the world’s first intellectual 
property treaty) established a priority system that made it easier to apply for 
patent protection on a country-by-country basis.12 It arose as a result of 
foreign exhibitors being unwilling to exhibit their inventions at the 
International Exposition of 1873 in Vienna because they believed they would 
not receive legal protection from imitators.13 Prior to the Paris Convention, 
inventors needed to arrange to simultaneously submit patent applications in 
each country in which they sought protection, otherwise the first application 
submitted would destroy the novelty in any subsequently submitted 
applications.14 The Paris Convention was initially adopted by eleven 
countries,15 and its membership has since grown to 176 countries and 
includes all the world’s industrialized nations and nearly all developing 
nations.16 
 
 9. Amir H. Khoury, The End of the National Patent Office, 52 IDEA 199, 202 (2012). 
 10. John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 
710-12 (2002). 
 11. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art.1, Mar. 20, 1883, last revised July 
14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. 
 12. Id. at art.4. 
 13. Warren S. Wolfeld, Note, International Patent Cooperation: The Next Step, 16 CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 229, 235 (1983). 
 14. Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Vivian S. Kuo, World Patent System Circa 20XX A.D., 38 IDEA 529, 
532. 
 15. The original signatories to the Paris Convention were Belgium, Brazil, France, Guatemala, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Salvador, Serbia, Spain and Switzerland. 
 16. For a list of all nation states that are contracting parties to the Paris Convention, see States Party 
to the PCT and the Paris Convention and Members of the World Trade Organization, 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/pct/en/texts/pdf/pct_paris_wto.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2016) 
[hereinafter Paris Convention Parties]. As Von Holstein has noted, given that the Paris Convention 
originated at a time when nation states jealously guarded their national sovereignty, the formation and 
wide adoption of the Paris Convention is a remarkable feat: Von Holstein, International Cooperation in 
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By 1970 the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) was introduced to 
provide a simplified means of obtaining global patent protection or patent 
protection in a multitude of countries. Although it does not lead to an 
international patent, the PCT allows a patent applicant to file a single patent 
application to commence the process of obtaining patent rights in any 
number of the PCT’s 150 member states.17 The result is a collection of 
national (or regional) patents in the jurisdictions in which patents are granted, 
all of which must be separately maintained and enforced. The PCT also 
provides for preliminary search and examination of the application, which 
gives an applicant a preliminary opinion as to whether the invention sought 
is patentable. 
Of recent notable interest is the considerable number of collaborative 
Patent Prosecution Highway (“PPH”) programs that have been established 
between national and regional patent offices for the purpose of sharing and 
relying on each other’s search and examination results. These programs, 
usually bilateral, are created with the aim of reducing the time taken to 
examine patent applications and the backlog of pending applications in many 
patent offices around the world.18 
While these, and other initiatives, are steps in the right direction, what 
is needed is a bold jump from nationally-focused systems to true 
international integration. Such an outcome could only be achieved by way 
of countries voluntarily agreeing to the terms of a multilateral international 
agreement. 
II. THE PROPOSAL IN BRIEF 
It is proposed that the current fragmented and inefficient system by 
which a multiplicity of separate national patents is applied for, examined and 
enforced in respect of the same invention in many nation states be replaced 
by a genuinely international patent system. In pursuance of this objective, it 
is proposed that all member states to a new international treaty cease granting 
national patents and instead recognize the validity of a unitary patent of 
global effect issued by an international patent office. 
The main goals of this proposal are to reduce the duplication of effort 
and expense involved in nation-states maintaining parallel national or 
regional patent systems, to improve patent quality, to consolidate the 
collection and disclosure of state-of-the-art technical patent information in 
 
the Field of Patent Law with Special Reference to the Activities of the Council of Europe, 16 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 191, 193-94 (1967). 
 17. Paris Convention Parties, supra note 16. 
 18. See U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFF., THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN (2003); Alicia 
Pitts & Joshua Kim, Patent Prosecution Highway: Is Life in the Fast Lane Worth the Cost, 1 HASTINGS 
SCI. & TECH. L. J. 127, 127 (2009). 
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one place, to achieve substantive law harmonization in respect of 
patentability and patent enforcement, and to address difficulties a patent 
holder faces when seeking to enforce patent rights in many jurisdictions. 
While the proposal would require nation states to sacrifice a portion of their 
national sovereignty in respect of patents, it is argued that this sacrifice is 
essential to remove unnecessary inefficiencies present in the current system 
and bring the benefits of global patent protection within the reach of those 
other than just the wealthiest and best resourced multinational corporations. 
There are four principal parts to the proposal. 
At the heart of the proposal is a unitary international patent, to be known 
simply as an International Patent, the validity of which will be recognized in 
all member states that are signatories to a treaty giving effect to this proposed 
international patent system (the “International Patent Treaty”). The proposal 
involves a patent applicant filing a single patent application (an 
“International Patent Application”), which would lead directly to a single 
substantive examination by an appropriately resourced central international 
patent office (known as the “International Patent Office”). 
Furthermore, a review panel of the International Patent Office would, 
to the exclusion of member states, have sole power to centrally administer 
all pre-grant opposition and post-grant revocation challenges (with rights of 
appeal to the International Patent Court). The exclusion of national patent 
offices and national courts from these processes ensures that the result of any 
post-acceptance or post-grant challenge to a patent’s validity is given effect 
in all member states and remains uniform across the globe.  
Having patents examined only by a single central patent office removes 
the unnecessary duplication that occurs at present when national patent 
offices independently examine parallel patent applications filed in various 
nation states in respect of the same invention. More importantly, it has the 
potential to ensure sufficient resources (in terms of time, expertise and access 
to repositories of prior art) are devoted to ensuring that patent examination 
is done as well as it can be, to limit the granting of bad patents that are invalid 
for want of novelty, inventive step, or sufficient disclosure. This approach 
also has the potential to greatly reduce the filing, examination, maintenance 
and other associated fees currently borne by patent applicants. By 
streamlining the process in this way, it is anticipated that the cost of obtaining 
an International Patent could be comparable to that of obtaining a small 
number of national patents and that the on-going cost of maintaining the 
International Patent Office be met through patent filing and maintenance 
fees. 
The second part of the proposal concerns the substantive law 
harmonization necessary to sustain a single unitary patent and a single patent 
office that conducts all patent examinations. What is proposed in this regard 
is that the International Patent Treaty create a single test for patentability in 
line with the requirements presently set out in Article 27 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, but that it also permit member states to legislate that patents for 
certain classes of invention (to be set out in a list permitted patentable subject 
matter exclusions) are not enforceable in their jurisdictions. This allows 
member states to retain control over the classes of invention that are 
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protected by patents in their territories and to create subject matter exclusions 
over things like business schemes, computer programs and methods of 
treating the human body. This mechanism is a necessary means of 
accommodating the variety of disparate interests of the developed and 
developing nations that will be among the member states. 
The third part of this proposal differs significantly from previous 
proposals for a global patent system. It is proposed that matters of patent 
enforcement remain the exclusive domain of member states and their courts. 
As such, it is not proposed that the International Patent Court have a role in 
patent infringement proceedings. The key to this aspect of the proposal is 
that it takes advantage of the proposed substantive law harmonization. This 
substantive law harmonization makes practicable the hearing of cross-border 
patent disputes in a single nation’s courts, rather than a multiplicity of 
enforcement proceedings being heard in parallel in different national courts. 
The fourth, and perhaps the most controversial aspect of this proposal 
(and its main barrier to being implemented), is that it recommends an 
international patent system that has English as its one and only official 
language. This choice has been made because it is predicted that automated 
language translation tools will be developed to a point where they can be 
relied on to accurately translate the complex and detailed technical language 
of patent specifications by the time any international treaty implementing the 
proposal can be agreed upon and implemented. 
This proposal not only removes the difficulties associated with the need 
for patent applications to be separately examined in each county in which the 
applicant seeks patent protection, but also purports to address the difficulties 
a patent holder faces when seeking to enforce patent rights in many 
jurisdictions. Importantly, this proposal does not advocate for an 
international patent court capable of hearing patent infringement actions, 
which is arguably too much of an interference with national sovereignty. 
The barriers that stand in the way of the establishment of the proposed 
integrated international patent system are significant, but not 
insurmountable. The most significant barrier, as noted above, is the choice 
of English as the one and only language of the International Patent Office.  
Another likely impediment is the reluctance of nation states to 
relinquish the national sovereignty that gives them strong control over the 
processes by which patents are granted, refused and otherwise administered 
within their borders.19 This reluctance, coupled with the competing interests 
of various nation states (particularly the competing interests of developed 
and developing countries) is perhaps a reason why different countries have 
different national patent laws today. Barriers of this kind are not peculiar to 
patent law, but arise in respect of proposals to harmonize other fields such 
as environmental law, laws regulating the safety and sale of pharmaceuticals, 
and international trade law.20 
 
 19. Anthony D. Sabatelli & J.C. Rasser, Impediments to Global Patent Law Harmonization, 22 N. 
KY. L. REV. 579, 584 (1995). 
 20. Id. at 580. 
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Another potential barrier lies in likely objections from those in 
countries where most inventors do not seek patents. By signing up to a global 
patent system, they will be subject to patents they would not otherwise have 
been subject to. Due to the existing cost of patenting in multiple jurisdictions, 
in some places patents are not routinely sought and people are ordinarily free 
to imitate in those jurisdictions, provided the technology necessary to exploit 
the patent exists in those places. This is a freedom that will be lost with the 
introduction of a unitary international patent. The counter argument is that 
the people in many of these countries may not have the capacity to exploit 
the inventions described in most patents independently of the patentee, and 
would not even hear of the invention in the absence of a patentee bringing 
that invention into their country. 
Finally, opposition to the proposal can be expected from those with 
vested interests, such as patent agents and attorneys whose business models 
depend on the structures and institutions of the current international patent 
system. Removing the need to tailor and prosecute local national patent 
applications will reduce the work of those in the patent agent and attorney 
professions, particularly the lucrative work of acting as a foreign filing agent 
when a patent attorney in another country has created the patent application. 
III. THE PROPOSAL IN DETAIL 
This proposal aims to take the best elements of existing national patent 
systems and international treaties and adapt them to the needs of an 
integrated global system, while seeking to observe the need to accommodate 
disparate interests of nation states at different stages of development. 
Importantly in this regard, the resulting institutions must be independent. 
They must not be, or be seen to be, tools for furthering the interests of a 
particular regional constituency. 
A. A Unitary International Patent Issued by an International Patent Office 
The centerpiece of the proposal is that all member states delegate to the 
International Patent Office the exclusive power to grant patents that are of 
global effect. 
The proposal requires that a patent applicant file a single International 
Patent Application with the International Patent Office. This would lead 
directly to a substantive examination by the International Patent Office and 
the grant of a unitary International Patent, the validity of which would be 
recognized in all member states upon grant. The proposal further requires 
that the International Patent Office determine any challenges to the validity 
of an International Patent to the exclusion of member states. The grant of an 
International Patent would not result in the creation of a bundle of national 
patents like that which results from an application made pursuant to the 
European Patent Convention or the Patent Cooperation Treaty. The main 
difference in this regard is that the proposed international patent be a unitary 
patent whose validity is recognized by each nation state, but which can only 
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be enforced in that courts of each member state individually, and can only 
be revoked by application to the International Patent Office. 
It is proposed that by eliminating the expense required to maintain 
parallel national patent systems, it would be possible to re-conceptualize 
patent examination by mandating that more time be devoted to identifying 
relevant prior art and that examination be a collaborative exercise between 
patent examiners. Consolidating examination in one office eliminates the 
possibility that exists currently of national patent offices achieving 
inconsistent results when examining the same or practically identical parallel 
patent applications in respect of a single invention. 
The proposed international patent system would also have the 
advantage of consolidating state of the art technological patent information 
in one place. All patent applications and patent specifications would be 
published on the International Patent Office’s publicly accessible patent 
database. Presently, the state of the art technological information contained 
in patent specifications is scattered all over the world in patent databases 
operated by national or regional patent offices, some of which are more 
accessible than others. In addition, the proposal will necessarily require 
patent examiners to access a single electronic database of prior art to search. 
This would involve linking the databases of existing nation patent offices to 
create a global database of shared information.21 
The term of an International Patent will be 20 years, measured from the 
date a non-provisional (or complete) application is filed, which is presently 
the international norm established by the TRIPS Agreement.22 In the absence 
of compelling reasons, it would seem that this term ought to be retained. The 
system should allow for extensions of the patent term for patents on 
pharmaceuticals to compensate patentees for the time taken to obtain 
regulatory approvals needed before a pharmaceutical substance can be sold 
to the public.23 The allowable extension of the patent term should be for a 
period of up to five years. 
Obtaining an International Patent begins with a patent application (an 
“International Patent Application”) being filed with the International Patent 
Office and accompanied by the requisite filing fee. All patent application 
filings are to be electronic, and must be capable of being filed by patent 
attorney agents and members of the public. The application must contain an 
abstract, a specification and claims, as is required for patent applications in 
every country in the world today.24  
The proposal adopts the current approach that allows applicants to 
obtain an earlier priority date by filing a provisional application and maintain 
 
 21. Paul Edward Geller, An International Patent Utopia?, 25 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 515, 516 
(2003). 
 22. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 33, Apr. 15, 1994, 
1869 U.N.T.S 299, 33 I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 23. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman Act), 
Pub. L. No 98-417, §201 (1984) (codified as amended in 35 U.S.C. §156(a)(4)). 
 24. Patent Cooperation Treaty art. 3, Jun. 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231. 
  
178 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Vol 16:167 
the application so long as a complete application is filed within 12 months 
of the provisional.25 
The International Patent Office will, with necessary modifications, 
adopt the patent classification system administered pursuant to the 
Strasbourg Agreement and the microorganism deposit system of the 
Budapest Treaty. 
1. A single centralized publication 
In accordance with the current norm,26 the International Patent 
Application, including the patent specification it contains, will be published 
18 months after the application is filed, or earlier if the applicant asks that 
the application be published before this time.27 The application will be 
published on a publicly available online database maintained by the 
International Patent Office. This database must be easily searchable and 
accessible free-of-charge. 
The English-language specification will be published on the 
International Patent Office’s web site, along with machine translations in 
every language nominated by member states. Although translations of the 
application will be published, it is the English language application that 
remains the official application that is used in all dealings with the 
International Patent Office. The translations, however, will be used in 
infringement and non-infringement proceedings in national courts where the 
language used is not English. The translations need to be made available at 
this time because it would be inequitable for the system to allow a patent 
written in English to be enforced in a jurisdiction where English is not an 
official language. It might also be problematic for the courts to interpret a 
document in a foreign language that is the source of proprietary rights. Patent 
applicants must have the option to file their own translations to replace 
machine translations if they are not satisfied with a machine translation 
produced by the International Patent Office. 
It is disclosure of the patent specification through publication that gives 
effect to the patent applicant’s obligation to disclose the invention being 
patented.28 Presently, when an applicant seeks patent protection in one or 
more patent offices without filing in all countries, publication of the patent 
specification by one of those patent offices effectively discloses the 
invention everywhere in the world. This is so even though the patentee’s 
monopoly is only enforceable within the territorial borders of the country or 
countries in which a patent has been granted, whereas the information 
disclosed knows no borders. Previously language and isolation were more 
effective in locking information in one place and industrial capabilities 
 
 25. Paris Convention, supra note 11, art. 4. An applicant who files a provisional application must 
file a corresponding non-provisional (or complete) application within 12 months, otherwise the 
application lapses irretrievably (no extensions of time being permitted). 
 26. Duffy, supra note 10, at 715-716. 
 27. Patent Cooperation Treaty, supra note 24, art. 21(2)(b). 
 28. 35 U.S.C. §§ 112, 122. 
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limited the number of countries in which the invention could be practiced. 
Now the reproductive capabilities, accessibility and reach of the Internet 
really do mean that publication is global. 
The second function of the disclosure of a patent application is that it 
marks the start of the period during which the patentee can enforce rights of 
exclusivity. A patentee can sue in respect of any act that takes place from the 
time the application is published, but cannot commence infringement 
proceedings until the patent has been granted (which will not occur until after 
a substantive examination has been performed). It is proposed that the 
International Patent operate in the same way. That is, the holder of an 
International Patent will be permitted to sue in respect of any act that takes 
place from the time the specification contained in an International Patent 
Application is published, but cannot commence infringement proceedings in 
a national court until an International Patent is granted. Having a unitary 
international patent means that the patentee’s period of exclusivity in the 
invention begins at the same time everywhere in the world. 
2. Examination 
To ensure there is efficient use of the examiners’ time, International 
Patent Applications will not be examined unless and until the applicant has 
requested an examination. In the same way that not all national patents 
proceed to examination, not all International Patent Applications will be 
examined. There are various reasons why a patent application might not 
proceed to examination. It might be the case that the applicant has run out of 
money and can no longer afford to prosecute the application. Alternatively, 
the invention may have been superseded by better or cheaper substitutes. If 
an examination is not requested within five years of the International Patent 
Application having been filed, the application lapses irretrievably. 
There must be a means by which an applicant can request an expedited 
examination to obtain an International Patent quickly, say if the applicant 
wishes to prosecute infringement proceedings promptly or wishes to have 
certainty in its proprietary rights for the purpose of licensing or other 
commercial purposes. 
One aspect of the proposed system is to improve patent quality by 
ensuring appropriate resources (in terms of time, expertise and access to 
repositories of prior art) are directed to patent examination. One way to 
achieve this would be for patents to be examined by two or more teams of 
patent examiners working in competition. Examiners grouped in teams 
would work collaboratively to identify prior art and test the alleged invention 
against that prior art. Teams of examiners working competitively against one 
another will more likely produce “better” or more accurate results than 
examiners working in isolation with less incentive to produce the best results 
they can achieve.29  
 
 29. Duffy, supra note 10, at 707. 
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3. Pre-grant and post-grant opposition 
Acceptance (otherwise known as allowance), and publication of that 
acceptance, follows examination and precedes a pre-grant opposition period 
and a formal grant of an International Patent. Acceptance occurs when the 
patent examiners raise no further objections to the International Patent 
Application. Once an International Patent Application is accepted, a notice 
to that effect is published. A three-month pre-grant opposition period 
commences on publication of that notice. During that time, anyone who 
objects to the grant of an International Patent for the invention on the ground 
that the invention does not satisfy the international patentability 
requirements may commence an opposition proceeding by giving notice to 
the International Patent Office. Where the application survives any pre-grant 
opposition challenge or no such challenge is brought, an International Patent 
will be granted. 
As is currently the case with national patents, the grant of an 
International Patent shall be a prima facie indication of its validity, but not a 
guarantee. Post-grant opposition can be instigated by anyone who seeks 
revocation of an International Patent after it has been granted. Appeals from 
the International Patent Office’s decisions on both pre-grant and post-grant 
opposition can be appealed to the International Patent Court, whose decision 
as to patentability is final. 
Where the validity of an International Patent is challenged in 
infringement proceedings before a national court, the invalidity claim must 
be referred to the International Patent Office for adjudication and the national 
court proceedings are to be stayed until a decision on the claim for revocation 
is handed down. 
4. The International Patent Court 
The proposed International Patent Court is to function as an appeal 
court with a discrete and limited, but exclusive, jurisdiction. Its sole role is 
to consider appeals from the International Patent Office on pre-grant and 
post-grant oppositions. To be clear, the International Patent Court is to have 
no role in patent infringement proceedings or in actions in which a 
declaration of non-infringement is sought, as those matters remain the 
province of national legal systems. Thus, unlike in the European system, 
there is no scope in this proposal for an appeal from a court at the apex of 
the court hierarchy of a national legal system to a supranational court. 
Appeals from decisions of the International Patent Office shall be 
reviewed de novo, such that fresh evidence may be tendered. Proceedings of 
the court shall be conducted in English, the language of the proposed 
International Patent system. It is expected that the International Patent Court 
will operate more efficiently and deliver decisions more quickly than the 
courts in many member states. The International Patent Court’s decisions as 
to patentability are final and subject only to any appeal to the Appeal 
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Division of that court. Given the court’s exclusive jurisdiction in this regard, 
national courts will have no power to decide questions of patent validity or 
to review decisions of the International Patent Office. 
Investing a court with these kinds of limited and specific powers is not 
without precedent. For instance, German law does not provide a procedural 
means for initiating a claim or a counterclaim for a declaration of invalidity 
in regular courts.30 A German patent’s validity may only be challenged in a 
proceeding before the German Patent and Trademark Office (the Deutsches 
Patent und Merkenamet),31 appeals from which lie to the German Federal 
Patent Court (the Bundespatentgericht).32 The German Federal Patent Court 
only hears appeals of this kind and has no role to play in infringement 
proceedings. 
If the validity of an International Patent is at issue in a national court, 
the court will be empowered to grant a stay of its proceeding to allow a 
challenge to the patent’s validity to proceed before the International Patent 
Court, if the national court considers that the challenge appears to have merit. 
If the court takes the view that the invalidity claim lacks merit, it will refuse 
to grant a stay and will continue to determine the infringement proceeding. 
It is not proposed that the International Patent Court be comprised of 
divisions to service various regions around the world. What is proposed is a 
single court located in one place. The location of the International Patent 
Court (and its Registry) shall be agreed on by the member states. The 
location of the Registry shall be largely immaterial because all 
communications with the Registry and filings shall be conducted 
electronically. The advantage in having a single court without regional 
divisions is that the court will more likely produce uniformity in its decisions 
and its application of the patentability standards, rather than regional 
peculiarities. This in turn will preclude forum shopping by patent applicants 
who might choose a division of the court in which to file. 
The international body that administers the International Patent Treaty 
shall appoint judges that sit on the International Patent Court. These judges 
shall be drawn from the ranks of patent specialist jurists from national courts 
and must have an excellent command of the English language. 
Parties before the International Patent Court may appear in person or be 
represented by lawyers authorized to practice before a court of a member 
state or alternatively by a patent attorney or patent agent entitled to practice 
 
 30. MARKETA TRIMBLE, supra note 1, at 69. 
 31. See DEUTSCHES PATENT UND MERKENAMET, http://www.dpma.de (last visited Dec. 11, 2014). 
 32. See BUNDES PATENT GERICHT, https://www.bundespatentgericht.de/cms/ (last visited Dec. 11, 
2014). 
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in a member state. Video and telephone conferencing facilities should be 
available to facilitate hearings (as is available for hearings before most 
national patent offices). Corporate entities may be represented by an 
employee or officer. 
It is expected that law firms and patent attorney firms will respond to 
this structure by opening offices in the location of the International Patent 
Court or enter into agreements with affiliates that have offices where the 
International Patent Court is located.  
5. Peer-to-Patent-style third party contributions 
To leverage the best available resources to improve patent quality, a 
further aspect of the proposal is a Peer-to-Patent-style third party notification 
system, the purpose of which is to allow and encourage citizen-experts to put 
relevant prior art references before patent examiners.  
Peer to Patent is a means by which a community of self-selecting 
volunteers can work collaboratively to identify prior art relevant to selected 
pending patent applications. Those communities of citizen-experts use an 
online forum to read pending patent applications, search for and identify 
relevant prior art documents, and submit relevant prior art to a national patent 
office. The most relevant prior art documents selected by the community are 
then placed before the examiner to be used to assist the examination. The 
input of these third party citizen-experts can be of great value in improving 
patent quality because it has the potential to bring relevant prior art to the 
attention of examiners who might not otherwise locate it.33 
To date the various Peer to Patent projects have operated in conjunction 
with national patent offices and have sought input from the community on 
various patent applications before those national offices. The International 
Patent System proposed presents an opportunity to consolidate those 
communities of citizen experts that have hitherto been organized along 
national lines and focus them on the task of locating prior art relevant to one 
set of patent applications. This will remove the possibility of different 
national Peer to Patent projects duplicating effort in conducting prior art 
searches in respect of the same invention claimed in different jurisdictions, 
and remove the difficulties of maintaining a critical mass of peer reviewers.34 
As such, to take full advantage of the opportunities for public review 
that are available, it is proposed that the International Patent System 
described in this article must allow third party Peer to Patent style 
contributions. The proposal thus involves the International Patent Office 
 
 33. See generally BETH SIMONE NOVECK, WIKI GOVERNMENT: HOW TECHNOLOGY CAN MAKE 
GOVERNMENT BETTER, DEMOCRACY STRONGER, AND CITIZENS MORE POWERFUL (Brookings Inst. Press 
2009); Beth Simone Noveck, ‘Peer to Patent’: Collective Intelligence, Open Review, and Patent Reform, 
20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 158 (2006). 
 34. For an example of Peer to Patent projects, see generally Brian Fitzgerald et al., Peer-To-Patent 
Australia: First Anniversary Report, QUEENSLAND U. OF TECH. 1 (Dec. 2010), 
http://www.peertopatent.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2013/11/P2PAU_1st_Anniversary_Report.pdf. 
  
2016 THE TIME IS NIGH 183 
creating a means by which third party volunteers are permitted to make prior 
art submissions online that will be put before and considered by the 
examiners during examination. It is also proposed that prior art submissions 
be permitted for the use in both pre- and post-grant opposition proceedings 
before the International Patent Office.  
B. Substantive Law Harmonization and a Single Centralized Examination 
Having a single unitary patent and a single international patent office to 
conduct all patent examinations requires substantive law harmonization of 
patentability requirements and the law in respect of infringement and 
remedies. However, in order to achieve the consensus needed to bring this 
proposal to fruition, it is necessary that member states be permitted to retain 
a degree of flexibility in regard to the divisive issue of the scope of patentable 
subject matter. 
1. Harmonization of patentability requirements 
What is proposed in this regard is that the International Patent Treaty 
create a single test for patentability in line with the requirements presently 
set out in Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement, but that it also permit member 
states to legislate that patents for certain classes of invention (to be set out in 
a list permitted patentable subject matter exclusions) are not enforceable in 
their jurisdictions. That is, subject matter exclusions are to be applied at the 
national level during infringement proceedings, and not at the international 
level during examination. 
Article 27.1 provides that, subject to certain exceptions, “patents shall 
be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields 
of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are 
capable of industrial application.” Thus, it is proposed that the International 
Patent Office examine an International Patent Application to test whether the 
invention is novel, involves an inventive step (non-obviousness), and is 
capable of industrial application (utility), in addition to the requirements that 
the invention falls within the bounds of patentable subject matter and that the 
invention is sufficiently disclosed in the patent specification. 
Insofar as patentable subject matter is concerned, it is proposed that the 
International Patent Office apply a broad and unrestricted subject matter 
eligibility threshold similar to that observed in United States law. In this 
regard, it is proposed that the International Patent Treaty define the scope of 
patentable subject matter in terms that reflect the sentiment expressed in 
Diamond v Chakrabarty that patentable subject matter comprises “anything 
under the sun that is made by man.” 35  
However, it is also proposed that member states retain the right to 
legislate to not allow certain classes of invention to be enforced within their 
territories. These classes of permissible excluded matter will be identified in 
 
 35. 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. No 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H.R. REP. 
No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 6 (1952)). 
  
184 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Vol 16:167 
the International Patent Treaty, and would necessarily include (to list a few) 
business methods, human beings and other living organisms, genes, 
computer software, and methods of medical treatment and diagnosis. In 
short, this aspect of the proposal allows member states the freedom to 
implement domestic laws that, while not denying an International Patent’s 
validity, make certain classes of International Patent not enforceable in their 
territories. 
This would seem to be a key element in achieving international 
consensus as it allows member states to retain control of potentially deal-
breaking issues of patentable subject matter in a way that serves the interests 
of both developed and developing countries.36 By leaving these kinds of 
possibly divisive patentable subject matter issues to national legislatures and 
courts, there is scope for allowing recognition of particular national or 
regional interests, making the proposal more likely to achieve consensus. 
This approach involves the application of the broadest conception of 
patentable subject matter at the international level, which means that many 
of the difficult and contentious patent eligibility cases like those considered 
in Bilski v. Kappos,37 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, and Alice Corp v. CLS 
Bank,38 will in the future be determined by the International Patent Office 
according to an international patentability standard set out the International 
Patent Treaty, rather than by national courts. What national courts will be 
asked to determine will be the meaning and scope of the permitted categories 
of excluded matter. For instance, a country that legislates to not permit 
International Patents concerning business methods to be enforced within its 
territory will need to determine what falls within the scope of that excluded 
class. 
In accordance with this international patentability test, novelty and 
inventive step are to be assessed with regard to an absolute or global prior 
art base. It is proposed that novelty and inventive step in relation to acts done 
be considered in opposition proceedings only rather than in examination. 
Ensuring that the prior art base includes acts done, as well as documents, 
provides a means of rejecting or opposing an International Patent 
Application for want of novelty or inventive step on the grounds that what is 
claimed in the application has been done before, or is obvious in light of what 
has been done before, even in cases where those acts have not been 
documented (which may offer a greater protection from the propertization of 
 
 36. Nation states would, of course, have the ability to enter into bilateral or multilateral treaty 
obligations that dictate that certain classes of invention will be enforced in the jurisdictions of member 
states. 
 37. 561 U.S. 593, 612 (2010). 
 38. 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014). 
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traditional knowledge by outsiders). In terms of novelty, the system shall be 
a first-to-file system. 
There is scope for the system to incorporate a grace period. A grace 
period excuses any self-publication by the inventor or applicant within a 
certain period preceding the filing of a patent application.39  
In the interest of achieving an international consensus, the United States 
would either need to abandon its best mode requirement (whereby the 
description of the invention is to disclose the best mode for carrying out the 
invention known to the applicant)40 or convince countries that do not have 
an equivalent of its merits. The recent Australian decision of Les 
Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Pty Ltd41 highlights the value of a best mode 
(or in the Australian parlance, best method) requirement, being that a failure 
to disclose the best mode known to the applicant of performing the invention 
potentially leaves a large field for experiment for anyone wishing, say after 
the expiry of the statutory monopoly, to achieve the same results as the 
applicant has achieved through using the patented invention. That is, in some 
cases, a failure to disclose the best mode of performing an invention can in 
effect amount to a failure to adequately disclose the invention to an unwitting 
public that is saddled with the patentee’s monopoly. 
Given the expansive geographic protections recommended in this 
article, compulsory licenses will be a necessary feature of the proposed 
system. Compulsory licenses must be available where: (1) there has been a 
failure to exploit the invention in a jurisdiction in a way that satisfies the 
reasonable requirements of the public; and (2) attempts to obtain a license 
under reasonable commercial terms have failed.42 This aspect of the proposal 
aims to encourage voluntary licensing of patents in places where the inventor 
would not ordinarily commercially produce the invention immediately or 
promptly. This is not to penalize patentees, but is simply a means of 
promoting access to new technologies on equitable terms. It is proposed that 
to seek a compulsory license to use an International Patent in a particular 
country or countries, a person must apply to a national court after a period of 
three years has lapsed since the patent was granted. The amount of 
compensation can set by the court, agreed between the patentee and licensee, 
or determined through arbitration. 
 
 39. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1) (2015). 
 40. 35 U.S.C.S. § 112 (2008). 
 41. [2016] FCAFC 27 (Austl). See also British Dynamite Co v. Krebs [1896] 13 R.P.C. 190, 192 
(UK). 
 42. Paris Convention, supra note 11, art. 5(A)(2); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 22, art. 31. 
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The International Patent Treaty should give member states latitude in 
determining the circumstances under which compulsory licenses can be used 
in response to matters of public health and national emergency. In particular, 
they should have a degree of latitude to award compulsory licenses to permit 
the importation of pharmaceuticals manufactured in other countries to 
address national health emergencies.  
It is envisaged that the International Patent Treaty would recognize 
rights based on prior use of the invention as a defense to a patent 
infringement allegation, in line with the way rights of prior user are 
recognized in most countries today. Prior user rights provide a defense to 
patent infringement to a person who was using the patented invention before 
the patentee filed a patent application or publicly disclosed the invention.43 
For a prior use defense or exception to infringement to apply, the act must 
constitute a patent infringement. Non-infringing acts, such as acts done 
privately for non-commercial purposes or acts done for experimental 
purposes relating to the invention do not constitute a prior use that gives rise 
to the defense. Naturally, an act done in public that amounts to an enabling 
disclosure is a prior disclosure of the invention, which anticipates the 
invention and deprives it of novelty and renders the patent invalid. In this 
instance, there would technically be no infringement and the prior user would 
be free to use the invention on the basis that the patent is invalid. 
Finally, it is not proposed that courts be empowered to award punitive 
damages, which are available in cases of willful infringement in the United 
States but not elsewhere in the world,44 although this is a matter for member 
states to resolve when negotiating the International Patent Treaty. Further, it 
is envisaged that the issue of whether criminal sanctions be available for 
intentional and commercial-scale patent infringement is to remain a matter 
for member states. 
2. Harmonization of laws in respect of infringement and remedies 
Regardless of which jurisdiction a patent infringement suit is brought 
in, International Patents must be considered against the same infringement 
rules. The notion of infringement shall be based, as it is now, upon a person 
or entity other than the patentee exercising any of the exclusive rights 
reserved to the patentee without the patentee’s authorization.45  
 
 43. 35 U.S.C § 273 (2011). 
 44. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000). 
 45. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 22, art. 28, 31; 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994). 
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One important issue in respect of enforcement is exhaustion of a 
patentee’s rights. In a system in which there are unitary patents of global 
effect, a patentee’s rights are logically exhausted when a patented invention 
is put on a market with the patentee’s consent, and the patentee has no rights 
to prevent products embodying the invention being exported to a new 
market. This would create difficulties for International Patents over products 
such as pharmaceuticals, for which price discrimination between 
jurisdictions is ordinarily employed. In contrast, using a national exhaustion 
principle, the patent holder can prevent importation into a different country 
by asserting a separate patent in the country into which the product is to be 
imported.46 It would thus seem to be necessary for the International Patent 
Treaty to provide a means of permitting price discrimination, say between 
developed and developing countries (to permit lower prices to be charged for 
the product in developing countries). 
Uniformity of the remedies available in patent infringement suits is 
necessary to facilitate cross-border patent disputes by allowing a court in one 
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon patent infringements occurring both within 
that court’s territorial jurisdiction and in other jurisdictions. It will also deter 
forum shopping. 
In addition to the usual remedies of damages or an account of the 
defendant’s profits obtained by using the patented invention, it is proposed 
that the International Patent Treaty specifically provide national courts with 
the power to grant both interlocutory and final injunctions when a defendant 
infringes an International Patent in multiple jurisdictions. In these 
circumstances, it is proposed that national courts be empowered to order that 
the defendant be enjoined from engaging in conduct that infringes an 
International Patent, without concern as to whether that enjoined conduct is 
likely to occur outside its jurisdiction’s borders. This is an order without 
geographic limitation since an International Patent has effect in all member 
states. 
In the current system, there are two difficulties associated with 
injunctions in cross-border cases. The first is that courts are reluctant to grant 
injunctions when they have no means of ensuring the defendant’s 
compliance with the order. The second is that a court will not grant an 
injunction if it believes the terms of that order may cause a conflict with the 
laws of the second country. 
It is suggested that difficulties of this nature are of limited concern in 
this proposal because the effects of substantive law harmonization make it 
 
 46. Barton, supra note 1, at 351. 
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feasible for the courts in all member states to have the power to enforce each 
other’s orders. If a court in Country A grants an injunction prohibiting Party 
B from engaging in certain conduct, and Party B travels to Country B and 
continues to engage in that conduct, then the courts in Country B will have 
personal jurisdiction over Party B and can enforce any injunction awarded 
by Country A’s courts. 
Given the substantive law harmonization proposed in this article, the 
likelihood of an order made by the courts of one country causing a conflict 
with the laws of a second country is minimal. The only exception is that the 
courts in one member state should not seek to enforce an International Patent 
in another member state if the second member state does not allow the 
patents of that class to be enforce within its borders (because it has enacted 
a permissible subject matter exclusion). 
It is also necessary that national courts be empowered to grant 
provisional and protective remedies to maintain the status quo pending the 
determination of a trial. These might include: orders to prevent an (imminent 
or continuing) infringement occurring or continuing to occur (an 
interlocutory injunction); orders to preserve relevant evidence in regard to 
the alleged infringement; orders to seize goods suspected of infringing; and 
orders directing a party to provide information about the location of assets 
which are subject to an order.47 
Also required is harmonization of the law in regard to patent claim 
construction, which in turn will affect the way in which patent claims are 
drafted. In this regard, what is required is that a decision as to whether 
International Patents be drafted by means of central claiming (by which the 
claims identify the “center” of the patented invention), or peripheral claiming 
(where the claims identify the exact periphery or boundary of the patent, 
usually by listing its necessary characteristics).48 What is essential in this 
regard is that patents and patent enforcement laws be uniformly interpreted 
by national courts.49 It is also proposed that nation states implement a legal 
requirement that their courts enforce a doctrine of equivalents,50 although 
this will naturally be a point of negotiation for member states.51 
 
 47. European Max Planck Group on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property, Principles for 
Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property, Art. 2:501(3), www.imprs-ci.ip.mpg.de/_www/files/pdf2/draft-
clip-principles-25-03-20117.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2016). 
 48. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim 
Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1743-47 (2009). 
 49. See generally TRIMBLE, supra note 1. 
 50. Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1948). 
 51. Burk & Lemley, supra note 48, at 1763. 
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C. Enforcement in National Courts 
This third part of the proposal is that enforcement and related matters 
remain the exclusive concern of member states and their courts. The role of 
national courts will be to hear infringement proceedings, proceedings in 
which declarations of non-infringement are sought and proceedings in which 
claims for unjustified threats of patent infringement are made. As a 
consequence, the International Patent Court will have no power to adjudicate 
in respect of these matters. As noted previously, the role of the International 
Patent Court will be limited to adjudicating on matters of patent validity. 
There are several reasons for favoring national courts for these tasks. 
Firstly, investing national courts with these powers allows litigants to access 
courts that are geographically proximate to their business activities and 
where they live, and which have familiar procedures. Secondly, this allows 
member states the flexibility to maintain subject matter exclusions within 
their territories. Finally, it is considered that the establishment of a world 
patent court with enforcement powers is a bridge too far at this time given 
nation states’ desires to maintain national sovereignty.52 This approach is 
arguably preferable to an international court comprised of regional divisions 
that may develop regional peculiarities that lead to a lack of consistency 
across divisions. 
An important aspect of this part of the proposal is that, with some 
exceptions, national courts will have the power to hear and determine cross-
border patent infringement suits where the acts of infringement are alleged 
to have occurred not just within the court’s territorial jurisdiction, but also 
outside. It is also proposed that, in addition to the power to make awards of 
damages or account of profits in respect of foreign infringements, those 
courts be expressly given the power to grant both interlocutory and final 
injunctions of extraterritorial effect that will be recognized outside their 
borders.53 
Ensuring that national courts are empowered to hear cross-border patent 
disputes overcomes some of the significant difficulties patentees who seek 
to enforce their patents in many jurisdictions currently face. It is at present 
difficult to enforce a patent outside the country in which it was granted 
because many courts generally decline to consider questions that arise in 
relation to foreign patents. Many courts generally refuse to adjudicate claims 
 
 52. This is not a view that is shared by all, see Mossinghoff & Kuo, supra note 14, at 546-48. 
 53. In some places this happens already. Courts in the Netherlands have issued extraterritorial 
injunctions in response to the infringement of foreign patents in foreign countries using a procedure 
known as kort geding: see CHRISTOPHER WADLOW, ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 14-20 (1998). 
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that a foreign patent has been infringed because the patent can only be 
enforced if it is valid, which brings the patent’s validity into issue. Patent 
validity is often pleaded in a counterclaim for revocation or as a defense.54 
This proposal avoids the current need for a multiplicity of proceedings by 
removing the territorial nexus of patents, coupled with the substantive law 
harmonization it achieves (in terms of patentability standards and the law in 
respect of infringement and remedies). This substantive law harmonization 
facilitates the resolution of cross-border infringement disputes in a single 
court because it removes any possibility of a conflict of laws arising, and 
thus obviates any need for a court to apply either choice of law rules or 
foreign law, other than in respect of patentable subject matter exclusions a 
foreign state may have imposed.  
It is proposed that the International Patent Treaty set out rules governing 
the way cross-border disputes are managed, coordinated and enforced 
between the courts in member states. The rules will govern: 
(a) jurisdiction, including the circumstances in which a national court 
may assume jurisdiction in a multi-national cross-border patent 
infringement suit, and any circumstances in which it must decline 
to exercise jurisdiction; 
(b) a court’s power to grant a stay when a defendant claims in 
infringement proceedings that the International Patent being 
asserted is invalid; 
(c) the coordination of parallel proceedings involving the same parties 
and issues; 
(d) recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments; and 
(e) the management of litigation involving patent infringement claims 
and other non-patent claims. 
The aims of these rules must be to, firstly, prevent a multiplicity of 
parallel proceedings in respect of the same International Patent in several 
national courts (and in doing so, remove the possibility of courts in different 
member states rendering irreconcilable decisions). Secondly, the rules must 
facilitate the mutual recognition and enforcement of decisions rendered by 
courts in member states. Each will be considered in turn as follows. 
 
 54. Jan K. Voda, M.D. v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 899 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Stein Assocs, Inc. v. 
Heat & Control, Inc., 748 F.2d 653, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“Only a British court, applying British law, can 
determine validity and infringement of British patents.”); Potter v. Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd [1906] 3 C.L.R. 
479, 479 (Austl.); Gesellschaft für Antriebstechnik mbH & Co KG (GAT) v. Lamellen und Kupplungsbau 
Beteiligungs KG (LuK) [2006] E.C.R. I-6509, I-6529-30 (Ger.). 
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1. Jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments 
The proposed International Patent Treaty requires definitive rules for 
establishing personal jurisdiction in matters involving an International 
Patent, regardless of the forum in which the matter is heard. These are rules 
that are to be applied when deciding whether a national court has jurisdiction 
to hear and determine a dispute involving an International Patent. These rules 
should exclude the operation of national laws within any member state that 
are relevant to establishing personal jurisdiction. The International Patent 
Treaty should also provide rules that govern the circumstances under which 
a court in a member state must recognize the judgment of a foreign member 
state in a matter involving an International Patent.  
The rules regarding personal jurisdiction will be necessarily tailored to 
a defendant’s convenience. For obvious reasons, a defendant will usually 
prefer to be sued where he or she resides or where the facts giving rise to the 
plaintiff’s lawsuit occurred – and principles of fairness dictate that this be so. 
While it is not desirable to formulate precise rules for the purposes of this 
article, it is proposed that (at a minimum) a national court only have personal 
jurisdiction in a matter involving an International Patent if the defendant has 
“sufficient minimal contacts” with the forum state, such that the proceeding 
does not offend notions of fairness and justice. This formulation mirrors the 
notion of personal jurisdiction described in International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington.55 Such minimal contacts should likely include consideration of 
matters such as the defendant’s domicile or habitual residence, the 
defendant’s center of operations, places where the defendant sells products 
or provides services, and the place where the infringing activity occurred. If 
an expansive concept of personal jurisdiction of this kind is adopted, it is 
envisaged that the International Patent Treaty will not need a provision 
enabling a form of “long-arm” jurisdiction, which is a means of empowering 
courts to assert personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants. The rules 
establishing a court’s jurisdiction will also need to take into account the 
possibility of an action involving multiple defendants.  
It is further proposed that the International Patent Treaty contain a 
provision which stipulates that a defendant can object to the plaintiff’s choice 
of forum on the ground that it is an inappropriate venue for the hearing of 
the dispute, even though the court may validly assert personal jurisdiction. 
This provision should stipulate the matters to be considered in determining 
whether a plaintiff’s chosen forum is inappropriate. Those matters can be 
taken from the existing law in respect of forum non conveniens, and arguably 
 
 55. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
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ought be based on the factors described in Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. 
Cansulex Ltd.56 The approach adopted in that case was that a stay of 
proceedings will only be granted where there is a more appropriate forum 
available for the trial of the action, and that a continuation in the forum would 
be oppressive or vexatious. It is not sufficient to show that the forum court 
is not the natural or appropriate forum for the trial. A natural forum for a 
dispute is one in which the action has a real and substantial connection.57  
The International Patent Treaty should further stipulate that a national 
court will have jurisdiction if the defendant proceeds on the merits without 
contesting the court’s jurisdiction, and that the defendant has the right to 
contest jurisdiction no later than the time he or she files a first defense on the 
merits. It should also stipulate that, if defendant does not appear to contest 
the merits at trial, the court may enter judgment in his or her absence, 
provided that it is satisfied that the plaintiff’s assertions that the court has 
jurisdiction have merit. Otherwise, the procedural rules in the forum state 
will apply to determine how the proceeding is to be conducted.  
Finally, the International Patent Treaty will need to stipulate the 
circumstances under which a party can enforce a foreign judgment in respect 
of an International Patent in the courts of a member state. Those 
circumstances, at a minimum, should be that: (1) the judgment was not 
obtained fraudulently; (2) the parties had an opportunity to be heard in the 
court in which the judgment was obtained; and (3) the foreign court had 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 
In terms of subject matter jurisdiction, a court in a member state that 
has jurisdiction in respect of patents will necessarily have the power to hear 
matters involving an International Patent, other than matters relating to 
validity. However, it may happen that patent infringement claims are pleaded 
in conjunction with contract (or other related) claims in a single proceeding. 
In most instances, it will be desirable for one court to have jurisdiction over 
the infringement claims as well as the related claims. Consequently, it is 
proposed that the International Patent Treaty provide that courts in member 
states have jurisdiction to hear infringement claims that arising out of a 
contractual relationship concerning the International Patent in question, and 
that resulting decisions be recognized in other member states.  
 
 56. [1987] A.C. 460 (UK). 
 57. Id. at 476. 
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2. Defendants claiming invalidity in infringement proceedings 
Given this proposal’s separation of the roles of national courts to 
conduct enforcement proceedings and the International Patent Office to 
conduct opposition proceedings where an International Patent’s validity has 
been challenged, there must be a means of managing those proceedings when 
a defendant challenges the validity of an International Patent in a proceeding 
before a national court. 
If a defendant challenges an International Patent’s validity in a 
proceeding before a national court, and the court forms the view that the 
challenge appears to have merit, the national proceeding is to be stayed while 
the challenge to validity is referred to an expedited post-grant revocation 
hearing by the review panel of the International Patent Office. The national 
court’s stay shall remain in place until the result of the International Patent 
Office’s review is relayed to the court. As decisions of the International 
Patent Office are subject to appeal to the International Patent Court, the stay 
shall remain in place until any appeal to International Patent Court on matters 
of patentability is determined or the time period in which a party can seek 
such an appeal has expired, whichever occurs first. 
To ensure that validity challenges do not unnecessarily delay 
infringement proceedings, it is proposed that a limit of 60 days be imposed, 
within which a party asserting that an International Patent is invalid must 
seek an expedited opposition hearing by the review panel of the International 
Patent Office. 
A national court’s decision to grant a stay affects only the proceeding 
before it and it does not prevent a person mounting a validity challenge in 
the International Patent Office if the national court does not grant the stay. If 
a court refuses to grant a stay when one is requested and proceeds to consider 
the question of infringement, the court’s decision is subject to any later 
decision on validity handed down by the International Patent Office or the 
International Patent Court on appeal. In essence, this means that if the court 
rules that there has been an infringement, but the patent is later revoked, the 
court’s decision will be nullified. In any event, a court that declines the grant 
of a stay in the face of a validity challenge being mounted before the review 
panel of the International Patent Office must stay any judgment it enters in 
favor of a patentee. In urgent matters, a national court does not necessarily 
need to delay its proceeding by issuing a stay when a challenge to the patent’s 
validity is raised; it might proceed to consider the infringement allegation at 
trial and simply stay the enforcement of its final decision until the 
International Patent Office’s review of the patent has run its course and the 
appeal period has expired. Otherwise, the national court might make a final 
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ruling on the condition that the plaintiff undertake to compensate the 
defendant for any loss suffered as a consequence of the plaintiff exercising 
its rights in the judgment if the patent is later ruled to be invalid. This aspect 
of the proposal removes the threat of Italian or Belgian “torpedoes,” which 
are invalidity proceedings in which declaratory judgment is sought, that are 
purposely filed in slow courts for the purpose of delaying faster courts in 
rendering decisions on infringement.58 
In urgent matters, such as interlocutory matters, a national court can 
grant injunctive relief before a review of the patent’s validity takes place 
upon an undertaking as to damages,59 or a suitable security or bond, being 
given by the plaintiff.60 Any award of injunctive relief does not need to be 
stayed in the event that a challenge to the validity of the International Patent 
in question is commenced.  
3. Coordination of parallel proceedings involving the same parties and 
issues 
The proposal requires a means of coordinating parallel infringement 
proceedings in national courts. The system must be capable of dealing with 
circumstances of lis alibi pendens. This is a situation in which there are 
concurrent proceedings involving the same subject matter pending between 
the same parties in different jurisdictions at the same time. 
It is proposed that the International Patent Treaty contain a provision to 
the effect that the court first seized of jurisdiction has priority in all matters 
other than in cases involving an abuse of process. This emulates the position 
under the Brussels-I-Regulation.61 Courts later seized must stay their 
proceedings and await the determination of the court first seized, unless it is 
manifest that the judgment of the court first seized will not be recognized in 
the jurisdiction of the court later seized. For example, where Party A brings 
suit in Country A alleging that unjustified threats have been made, and later 
Party B brings suit in Country B alleging infringement, a lis pendens 
 
 58. For an explanation as to what Italian or Belgian “torpedoes” are see: David Kenny & Rosemary 
Hennigan, Choice-Of-Court Agreements, the Italian Torpedo, and the Recast of the Brussels I Regulation, 
64 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 197, 199 (2015). 
 59. An undertaking as to damages is a promise to pay appropriate compensation for any injury 
caused by these measures for which the undertaking is provided. 
 60. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 22, art. 50(3). 
 61. Council Regulation 44/2001, of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (l12) 1 (EC). See also Convention 
on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
Dec. 21, 2007, O.J. (L 339) 11. 
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situation arises and the first-in-time principle applies and the first proceeding 
takes precedence. 
Finally, once a national court with jurisdiction to hear an infringement 
suit issues a final decision, that issue becomes res judicata and the plaintiff 
is then estopped from bringing that issue before another court. 
4. Capacity of national courts to handle patent litigation 
Although fairness requires that infringement proceedings be conducted 
in a forum that is convenient for the alleged infringer, not all national courts 
are capable of managing the complexities and difficulties of patent litigation. 
Further, not all legal systems are reliable and not all member states will agree 
to accede to a system that potentially places their nationals at the mercy of 
orders emanating from foreign court systems that are perceived as being 
unreliable. For this reason, it is proposed that in some instances, special 
regional patent courts comprised of international patent experts be 
established to conduct the workload of some countries’ patent litigation. The 
alternative is that only certain existing national courts that are part of an 
internationally trusted legal system be granted the right to entertain cross-
border patent disputes, and that other national courts only have the power to 
hear and determine disputes concerns allegations of infringement occurring 
within their own borders. 
D. Language 
As noted above, the major impediment to the establishment of a truly 
international patent system is language – namely, the need to reach a 
diplomatic consensus that addresses the practical necessity to designate a 
language in which patent applications are drafted, published, examined and 
challenged. Thus, the most contentious aspect of this proposal is its 
recommendation to adopt English as the one and only official language of 
the international patent system.62 
There are prominent concerns in this regard. The first is the need to be 
wary of placing language barriers in the way of those who wish to obtain 
patent protection, particularly those who, in the absence of this proposal, 
would only seek patent protection in their country of residence and perhaps 
neighboring countries where the same language is spoken. The second is to 
 
 62. This proposal is not alone in this regard, as other authors have proposed English as the only 
language of an international patent system but make no mention of the possibilities of reliable machine 
translation. See Mossinghoff & Kuo, supra note 14, at 551-52. Meller, supra note 3, at 384. 
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not unfairly disadvantage those alleged of patent infringement by having the 
patent specifications written in a language that is incomprehensible to them. 
In relation to the first of these issues, it is proposed that the International 
Patent Office use only one language because it is unwieldy for more than 
one to be used. Even using a selection of languages, as the EPO does, is 
unwieldy (the EPO uses three official languages – English, French and 
German).63  
English is the obvious choice to be the one and only official language 
of the international patent system. It is the global lingua franca of science 
and is the primary language of scholarship throughout a world that is in many 
ways dominated economically, scientifically and culturally by Anglo-
American countries.64 English was described by The Economist in 1996 as 
being “impregnably established as the world standard language: an intrinsic 
part of the global communications revolution.”65 David Graddol has 
predicted that no other language will rival English as the dominant world 
language in the 21st century.66 
English is a truly international language. Although English is not the 
most widely spoken language on Earth, today it is the first language of about 
400 million people and the second language of as many as 1.4 billion more.67 
English is the logical choice because it has been the internationally dominant 
language through the nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries as a 
result of the political, economic and cultural might of Britain and the United 
States during that time in the way that languages such as Greek, Latin, Arabic 
and Spanish and French were in earlier times.68 Moreover, David Crystal has 
expressed the view that the prevalence of international collaboration renders 
it necessary that the world adopt a global lingua franca as a “working 
language” to cut down the impracticalities of multi-way translations.69 
 
 63. Implementing Regulations to the Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 14, Oct. 5, 
1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255 [hereinafter European Patent Convention] (European patent applications shall 
be filed in one of the official languages or, if filed in any other language, translated into one of the official 
languages in accordance with the Implementing Regulations). 
 64. DAVID GRADDOL, THE FUTURE OF ENGLISH? A GUIDE TO FORECASTING THE POPULARITY IF 
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 5-9 (The English Co. 1997); Donna E. Cromer, English: 
The Lingua Franca of International Scientific Communication, 12 SCI. & TECH. LIB. 21, 21-23 (1991); 
DAVID CRYSTAL, ENGLISH AS A GLOBAL LANGUAGE 68-69 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2nd ed., 2003). 
 65. Language and Electronics: The Coming Global Tongue, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 21, 1996, at 78. 
 66. GRADDOL, supra note 64, at 58. 
 67. Id. at 6. 
 68. Id. at 9-10. 
 69. Id. at 12. 
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Furthermore, English has more cultural resources in the form of literary 
works, films and television programs than any other language.70 Likewise, 
authors of scientific works place great emphasis on publication in 
international journals with an attractive impact factor, most of which are 
English-language journals.71 Some countries are actively taking steps to 
publish their scientific works in English. “China, for example, has an 
agreement with the German publisher Springer . . . to select the best articles 
from more than 1,700 Chinese [scholarly] university journals and translate 
them into English.”72 “Similarly, Czech, Hungarian and South Korean 
journals [that have been] indexed by Thomson Scientific . . . are almost all 
published in English.”73 As a consequence, most prior art documents that are 
relevant to the issue of whether a claimed invention is novel or involves an 
inventive step are likely to be written in English.  
Another benefit of the English language is that it is an official language 
of two of the “big four” patent offices, namely the USPTO and the EPO. In 
addition, both the Japanese and Chinese patent offices require their patent 
examiners to be fluent in English.74 Thus, there are already a large number 
of experienced patent examiners and other patent office staffers who are 
native speakers or who have professional experience in using the English 
language. 
Although choosing the English language will only further entrench its 
dominant position as the global language of science and commerce, doing so 
will make some head way in solving the problem of uncovering the “lost” 
science hidden in languages unfamiliar to the English-speaking scientific 
community.75  
Many commentators who seek this kind of procedural efficiency 
advocate reversing the EU’s present commitment to multilingualism in favor 
of adopting English as lingua franca. Jürgen Habermas sees the EU’s policies 
of “linguistic diversity . . . as a hindrance to economic progress or political 
integration and real democracy.”.76 Similarly, Theo van Els has explained 
 
 70. GRADDOL, supra note 64, at 2. 
 71. Rogerio Meneghini & Abel L. Packer, Is there Science Beyond English?, 8 EMBO REPS. 112, 
113 (2007). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Mossinghoff & Kuo, supra note 14, at 552. 
 75. See generally W. Wayt Gibbs, Lost Science in the Third World, 273 SCI. AM. 92 (1995); 
Meneghini & Packer, supra note 71, at 113. 
 76. Ulrich Ammon, Language Conflicts in the European Union, 16 INT’L JOURNAL OF APPLIED 
LINGUISTICS 319, 322 (2006) (stating Jurgen Habermas, a German sociologist and philosopher, supports 
the idea of a single institutional working language, and has proposed English as the necessary unifying 
language). 
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that making English the sole working language of the EU holds advantages 
for non-native English speakers.77 The first is that non-native speakers “need 
to develop competence in one foreign language only.”78 The second is that 
“this one foreign language will also become – and to an increasing extent – 
the property of the non-natives” and that “[i]f they constitute a large 
majority, as in the EU, they will, without doubt, use the working language as 
their language and share in the fashioning of this language to meet their own 
needs.”79 However, van Els posits that, “this appropriation of the working 
language by non-natives does not take place when there are two or more 
working languages, and in that case native speakers would not need to give 
up the ownership of their language.”80 
Machine translation technology is advancing at such a prodigious rate, 
it is anticipated that the difficulties of language translation will be a thing of 
the past by the time any treaty implementing this proposal can be made. 
Currently, machine translation technology is imperfect and the production of 
reliable translations of complex text containing technical subject matter still 
requires significant and time-consuming human input. Presently, machine 
translations are useful for getting a general idea of a text, but are not able to 
create a precise translation. Translations of complex technical documents, 
such as patent specifications, still require significant and time-consuming 
human involvement. However, many companies are making significant 
advances in this field. Google, Inc. (“Google”) offers translation 
technologies through its Google translate products.81 It is about to launch a 
real-time translation service for Skype.82 Then there is the joint initiative of 
the EPO and Google called Patent Translate that provides translations “from 
English, French and German into any of the 28 official languages of the 
EPO’s 38 member states, and vice versa, plus from Chinese, Japanese, 
Korean and Russian into English, and vice versa.”83  
This aspect of the proposal will not unfairly disadvantage those alleged 
of patent infringement by having the patent specifications written in a 
language that is foreign to them because machine translations of 
 
 77. See Theo van Els, Multilingualism in the European Union, 15 INT’L JOURNAL OF APPLIED 
LINGUISTICS 263, 275-78 (2005). 
 78. Id. at 276. 
 79. Id. 
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 81. E.g., GOOGLE TRANSLATE, https://translate.google.com/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2016). 
 82. E.g., SKYPE, http://www.skype.com/en/translator-preview/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2016). 
 83. See EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, 
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International Patents will be available from the International Patent Office’s 
website. Enforcement proceedings will be conducted in national courts in the 
official language of the place where the court is located. Depending on the 
rules of procedure in the forum, this may, require a translation of the patent 
into an official language of the country in which the court is located in the 
event that that language is not English. Otherwise, those courts are free to 
consider the English-language specification. 
To ensure fairness and transparency in the system, the accuracy of a 
patent translation can be challenged in an administrative proceeding before 
the International Patent Office. The International Patent Office can then 
order that changes be made to a translation or that the translation be removed 
and re-filed. Such a challenge will be grounds for a stay of court proceedings 
and possibly limit the scope of the International Patent concerned in any 
jurisdictions affected by the incorrect translation. 
IV. INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
It is envisaged that the International Patent Office would be operated by 
the World Intellectual Property Organization or a new international 
organization created specifically for this purpose. 
A. Funding and Staffing 
The initial funding of the International Patent Office and the 
International Patent Court would be provided by member states. The 
countries that believe there is a need for an integrated international patent 
system, and can afford to do so, will meet the initial establishment costs of 
the new system. 
The on-going costs of the International Patent Office and International 
Patent Court are to be funded by the patent filing fees and maintenance fees 
paid by patent applicants. These fees need to be modest to ensure that all 
inventors have reasonable access to the international patent system. It is 
proposed that these fees be comparable to the filing and maintenance fees 
currently applicable to a small number of national applications.84 It is 
proposed that there be two tiers of fees: (1) large corporate entities that are 
heavy users of the patent system (e.g., corporations and their associated 
entities that together have more than 500 employees); and (2) applicants who 
do not fall into this category. 
 
 84. By way of example, the USPTO’s current filing and patent maintenance fees are set out at: 
USPTO Fee Schedule, U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-
resources/fees-and-payment/uspto-fee-schedule (last visited Dec. 27, 2016). 
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It is not suggested that the International Patent Office be a source of 
revenue in the way that some national patent offices are currently.85 Rather, 
its fee structure should be designed to recoup costs so as to minimize its 
contribution to the cost of obtaining a patent. 
It is proposed that the International Patent Office be responsible for 
training of examiners, patent review panels, and other patent office staff. 
Further, it is proposed that International Patent Office also be responsible for 
the registration of patent attorneys or agents, and the accreditation of 
universities providing the necessary qualifications for those professions. 
B. Commencement and Transitional Arrangements 
The proposed system will only be feasible if it has a significant number 
of members. Accordingly, the International Patent Treaty will enter into 
force once thirty states ratify it. The world’s three most patent intensive 
countries, China, Japan, and the United States, along with the three most 
patent intensive states in Europe, Germany, France and the United Kingdom, 
must be among the states that have ratified the International Patent Treaty 
before it will enter into force. 
Previously granted national patents will remain in force and will be 
regulated and enforced according to national law until they expire, are 
revoked, or otherwise cease to exist or have effect. 
As a transitional matter, all applicants seeking national patents which 
are filed prior to the commencement of the proposed international patent 
system will continue as national applications and will result in the grant of a 
national patent, unless the applicant elects to convert a national patent 
application into an International Patent Application, which can be done 
before any national patent is granted in respect of the invention. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the formation of the Paris Convention in 1884, the world has 
slowly but inexorably been moving towards an integrated world patent 
system. The patent system is evolving from solely being a matter of domestic 
legislative and administrative concern to one that involves significant 
multilateral cooperation in a global, connected and integrated world. This 
proposal is an extension of this evolution. In recent times, that evolution has 
seen the advent of streamlined workload sharing arrangements between the 
 
 85. Barton, supra note 1, at 352; See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, NW. 
U.L. REV., Feb. 2001, at 1, 25 n.94. 
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trilateral offices of the EPO, the JPO and the USPTO, and also arrangements 
between those offices and other national patent offices. As former Director 
of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, James E. Rogan noted, 
pressure is mounting on national patent offices with more and more patent 
applications being filed each year to reach the objective of a truly 
international patent system.86 
While there are many obstacles to substantive patent law 
harmonization, both political and economic,87 the three core pillars of the 
proposed global patent system build upon advantageous structures and 
practices that have been established in domestic legal systems to date. The 
aims of the proposal are: (1) to make global patenting more accessible; (2) 
to improve patent quality and the availability of patent and prior art 
information; and (3) to improve the efficiency of patent enforcement by 
allowing cross-border patent disputes to be consolidated in national courts. 
The path to achieving an integrated global patent system will be a 
gradual one. Realistically, forming a global patent system of the kind 
proposed in this article might not be best achieved by conducting 
negotiations between all possible member states in a UN-like forum, but 
instead between a few select countries that are especially interested in patent 
rights. Michael Meller has made the same suggestion, noting that “the 1883 
Paris Convention was arrived at” by achieving consensus among “patent 
conscious countries” before being later adopted across the world.88 Today’s 
“most patent conscious” countries arguably include, at a minimum, the 
United States, China, Japan, and European countries, which together produce 
90% of the world’s patents. The best means forward might be for the 
proposal to be initially adopted in a small number of technologically 
advanced developed countries. 
Alternatively, it might be that the “global” patent system proposed in 
this article be adopted only by a subset of the world’s countries, while others 
that do not subscribe to its aims or contents could maintain their existing 
systems or form other alliances. In that case, as John Duffy has put it, 
“having four or five competing patent systems may be better than having one 
hundred.”89  
 
 86. James E. Rogan, Dir., U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Global Recognition of Patent Rights 
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In any event, a single, fully integrated, and harmonized world patent 
system of the kind proposed is needed because traders and consumers around 
the world rely on trade in global markets. The benefits of a fully integrated 
international patent system lie in efficiency. Obtaining and enforcing patents 
must not be prohibitively expensive if we are to take full advantage of the 
incentives to innovate that patents provide, obtaining and enforcing them 
must not be prohibitively expensive. While the initial costs of obtaining 
global patent protection remain excessive, the patent incentive is illusory for 
those who lack the necessary start-up capital or cannot access it through 
investors. Until these deficiencies are remedied by the introduction of a 
properly integrated international arrangement, the patent system will fail to 
deliver its full potential. 
